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I. THE WORLD HERITAGE LIST 
 
A. The UNESCO Convention 
 
 The World Heritage List compiled by UNESCO has become highly popular. Many 
regard it as “the most effective international legal instrument for the protection of the cultural 
and natural heritage” (Strasser 2002, 215). Most World Heritage Sites are major attractions 
for cultural tourism and are also icons of national identity (Shackley 2006, 85). 
 In the 1920s, the League of Nations became aware of the growing threat to the 
cultural and natural heritage of our planet. However, nothing concrete emerged despite years 
of intensive discussions and drafting of reports. In 1959, UNESCO launched a spectacular 
and successful international campaign to save the Abu Simbel temples in the Nile Valley. In 
1966, UNESCO also spearheaded an international campaign to save Venice after disastrous 
floods threatened the survival of the city. At its 17th session in Paris in November 1972, the 
General Conference of UNESCO adopted the Convention concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural heritage (UNESCO 1972). The Convention (Art. 4) recognizes 
“the duty of ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and 
transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage” around the world 
considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. It came into force in 1977 with 20 nations 
ratifying it. The Convention now includes 187 countries (UNESCO 2010), and the World 
Heritage List comprises 940 Sites,1 721 (or 77 percent) of which relate to culture, 192 to 
nature, and 27 are mixed; that is, they combine cultural and natural heritage. 
 The advisory bodies to the World Heritage Committee evaluated in a somewhat ad 
hoc fashion the sites initially included on the List. The Convention’s criterion of outstanding 
value to humanity is noble but proved to be almost impossible to define clearly. Therefore, an 
important development was the establishment of 10 criteria for inclusion in the World 
Heritage List, which are covered in detail in the Operational Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (UNESCO 2005a). Nominated sites must 
meet at least one of the 10 criteria (UNESCO 2005b), which take into account three 
comprehensive aspects: uniqueness, historical authenticity, and integrity or intactness. Six 
criteria refer to Cultural and four to Natural Sites. The former must “represent a masterpiece 
                                                 
1 After the 34th ordinary session of the World Heritage Committee, held in Brasília on July 25–August 3, 2010, 
the World Heritage List contains 911 Sites. For our purposes, we count Sites extending over more than one 
country as many times as the number of countries involved, therefore obtaining a higher number of Sites. We 
also disregard the two delisted Sites. 
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of human creative genius” (criterion i). The latter should “contain superlative natural 
phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance” (criterion vii). 
Appendix I of the Operational Guidelines contains the full list of criteria, as does our 
Appendix. 
 The composition of the World Heritage List is the outcome of actions by three 
different bodies: the state parties that nominate the Sites, the committee that formally decides 
inclusion on the List, and two advisory boards. These bodies evaluate and propose the Sites 
for inscription. Member governments must propose the sites to be included on the List. 
Mayors, district governments, or heritage experts may only make proposals for inclusion on a 
tentative list. The official nomination of a Site occurs when a country hands in a complete 
nomination document. 
 The World Heritage Committee meets once a year and consists of representatives 
from 21 of the member countries. The General Assembly of the members of the Convention 
elects this committee for terms of up to six years. The intention of the Convention is an 
equitable representation of the world’s regions and cultures (Art. 8 [2]). However, the 
Convention nowhere mentions the means to achieve this goal. The Committee is the final 
decision-making body whose responsibilities include the World Heritage List, the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, administering the World Heritage Fund, and decisions on 
financial assistance. The World Heritage Convention is different from many other 
international conventions because all substantive powers are designated to the Committee and 
not to the General Assembly. The Committee is advised by the International Council on 
Museums and Sites (ICOMOS) for Cultural sites, by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for Natural sites, and by the International Centre for the 
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). It has been 
claimed: “The scrutiny of these systems by the two Advisory Boards is now rigorous.…” 
(Cleere 2006, xxii). 
 
B. Literature 
 
 There is an extensive literature on World Heritage and the UNESCO program; recent 
contributions are, for example, Leask and Fyall (2006), Harrison and Hitchcock (2005), van 
der Aa (2005), Leask and Yeoman (2004), and Howard (2003). The following aspects have 
received special attention: the process of designation with respect to its formal nature; the 
stakeholder groups participating as well as their politics (e.g., Strasser 2002; Millar 2006; 
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Cleere 2006); the consequences of inclusion in the World Heritage List, especially with 
respect to tourism (e.g., Tunney 2005; Cochrane and Tapper 2006 ); visitor management 
(e.g., Shackley 2006; McKercher and du Cros 2001); as well as case studies of individual 
Sites (e.g., for Stonehenge, Mason and Kuo 2006; for Machu Picchu, Regalado-Pezúa and 
Arias-Valencia 2006; for the Yellow Mountain in China, Li Fung and Sofield 2006; or for 
Angkor, Wager 1995). 
 In economics, few works deal with UNESCO’s World Heritage: the doctoral 
dissertation by van der Aa (2005), the book by Santagata, de Caro, and Marrelli (2008), and 
the articles by Frey and Pamini (2009, 2010) and Frey and Steiner (2010) being exceptions. 
An excellent analysis of general heritage issues is provided in Peacock and Rizzo (2008). 
Other economic analyses mainly evaluate the utility of preserving the past as well as financial 
consequences (see, e.g., Benhamou 1996, 2003; Frey 1997; Greffe 1999; Klamer and 
Throsby 2000; Mossetto 1994; Mossetto and Vecco 2001; Netzer 1998; Peacock 1978, 1995; 
Rizzo 2006; Streeten 2006; Throsby 1997a, 1997b, 2003). The collection of articles in Hutter 
and Rizzo (1997), Peacock (1998), and Rizzo and Towse (2002) also contain references to 
heritage, as do the more general monographs and collections by Frey (2003), Ginsburgh 
(2004), Ginsburgh and Throsby (2006), Towse (1997, 2003, 2010), and Throsby (2001, 
2010). The consequences of being listed, in particular on the number of visitors frequenting 
these Sites, are studied, for example, in Bonet (2003), Tisdell and Wilson (2002), and Yang, 
Lin, and Han (2009). 
 
C. Procedure 
 
 The effort of UNESCO to establish a World Heritage List containing the most 
treasured Sites of humanity’s culture and landscapes constitutes a great step forward towards 
preserving one of the most important global public goods on our planet. However, the List 
also has negative aspects that are often overlooked (see Section II). One striking aspect is the 
highly unequal distribution of Sites across countries and continents, which suggests that other 
factors than the 10 UNESCO “objective” criteria play a role (see Section III). In order to 
determine these factors, we first empirically investigate possible historical, cultural, or natural 
reasons why some countries have more sites than others do. The number of years a country 
has been a member of the Convention, the size of a country, the number of years that it has 
been part of a civilized culture, as well as historical GDP and population size are positively 
and significantly correlated with the number of Sites a country exhibits today (see Section 
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IV). Using these historical factors as controls, we estimate cross-section and panel-data 
models to identify the stock and flow determinants of getting on the List. The impact of the 
relative importance of the tourist sector (negative), the media sector, federalism, and being a 
member of the UN Security Council (positive) on the number of Sites a country obtains are 
the most robust (see Sections V and VI). Section VII concludes that factors unrelated to the 
value of heritage have a significant impact on the composition of the List. 
 
II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS 
 
 The World Heritage List is generally considered an excellent contribution to saving 
the globe’s common history in the form of cultural monuments and landscapes worth 
preserving. The undisputed and well-known positive effects of being on the List relate mainly 
to the attention attracted and improved protection. Being on the List attracts the attention of 
the general public, public decision makers, potential donors, and for-profit firms. As long as 
this additional attention leads to increased funding, it is beneficial for maintaining the Sites. 
To support the preservation of Sites, UNESCO offers technical but only very limited 
financial help.2 
 Being on the List is also related to some negative aspects (for an extensive discussion 
of the benefits and negative aspects of the World Heritage List, see Frey and Steiner 2010). 
First, the prominence of the List can contribute to the destruction of a Site. A higher number 
of visitors can accelerate deterioration. For example, this has been the case for Machu Picchu 
and the Heart of Neolithic Orkney, where access to parts of the Site has had to be restricted 
due to condensation problems. The Sites can also become a target in times of war (such as the 
bridges in Mostar, the city of Sarajewo, or the mosques in Banja Luka) or a target for 
terrorists. Second, an undesired substitution effect may take place when politicians, 
bureaucrats, and firms reallocate funds from other sites to those on the List. The loss of funds 
of the non-UNESCO sites may well lead to the overall heritage being less well preserved. 
Third, the number of Sites on the UNESCO List has continuously grown (at an accelerating 
rate) over time. The Convention does not set a numerical limit for the List, and this 
overextension of the List imposes problems whereby the Committee has to monitor the state 
of conservation and management of the Sites. 
 Fourth, and most important here, the selection of the Sites is questionable because it is 
subject to rent seeking by experts and politicians. That is, politicians in their respective 
                                                 
2 The corresponding fund is only $4 million per year for over 900 Sites listed. 
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countries and expert representatives on the advisory groups ICOMOS and IUCN strongly 
influence the selection of what Cultural and Natural Sites should be on the List. In most 
cases, the Committee follows the experts’ recommendations. As a result, the definition of 
what is “outstanding universal value” is transferred from the Committee to a political body or 
technical experts. (Pressouyre 1996). Technical experts rely on their knowledge as art 
historians and conservators, but “the concept … has never been the object of a truly 
operational definition” (Musitelli 2002, 329). 
 Some scholars even question the legitimacy of the List. Meskell (2002) argues that the 
concept of World Heritage is flawed by the fact that it privileges an idea originating in the 
West, which requires an attitude toward material culture that is distinctly European in origin. 
Affluent countries seem to have benefited most from the Convention. According to a Report 
of the World Commission on Culture and Development, the World Heritage List “was 
conceived, supported and nurtured by the industrially developed societies, reflecting concern 
for a type of heritage that was highly valued in those countries” (Olmland 1997). Moreover, 
many countries do not have the necessary conservation infrastructure that allows them to 
prepare nominations to the List at a sufficiently sustained pace to improve its representativity 
(Strasser 2002, 226–227). According to the Convention, the state parties must identify and 
delineate the property (Art. 3); in addition, they must ensure the identification, protection, 
conservation, presentation, and transmission to future generations (Art. 4). These 
requirements put a heavy burden on countries wishing to put a site on the List. 
 Being on the UNESCO List is highly desired by many as it brings prominence and 
monetary revenue; one may even speak of a “heritage industry” (Johnson and Thomas 1995). 
As a consequence, the process of getting on the List is subject to rent seeking (Buchanan 
1980; Tollison 1982). It has been highly politicized as many political and bureaucratic 
representatives of countries consider it a worthwhile goal from which they personally profit. 
Consequently, the selection is subject to political pressures; thus, it is not determined solely 
by the 10 criteria listed above deemed to be “objective.” Although the goal of the whole 
project is to protect Sites of central importance for humanity, as expected, national interests 
dominate global interest. “The rhetoric is global: the practice is national.” (Ashworth and van 
der Aa 2006, 148.) Some countries more actively try to secure Sites to be included on the 
List. Twenty-one nations participating in the Convention have a seat on the World Heritage 
Committee. However, these members nominated more than 30 percent of the listed Sites 
between 1978 and 2004 (van der Aa 2005, 81). One example of a questionable selection 
occurred in 1997 when 10 Italian Sites where included on the List all at once, whereas the 
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chair of the Committee was a compatriot at that time. Also, the location within the country 
where the Committee holds its annual meeting seems to have an impact on the number and 
kind of nominations (for example, the meeting in 1997 that was just mentioned was held in 
Naples, see Cleere 1998). Francesco Bandarin, the Director of the World Heritage Centre, 
acknowledges, “Inscription has become a political issue. It is about prestige, publicity and 
economic development” (Henley 2001). 
 
III. UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SITES 
 
 A striking aspect about the UNESCO List is the highly unequal distribution of Sites 
among continents. Forty-six percent of the Sites are in Europe.3 The European predominance 
is larger for Cultural Sites (53 percent) than for Natural Sites (23 percent). In contrast, sub-
Saharan Africa has less than 9 percent of all Sites, and the Arabian countries have 7 percent. 
The Americas and Asia-Pacific are represented better with 17 percent and 21 percent, 
respectively (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 If the distribution according to the population is taken as a reference, Europe is still on 
top with 52 Sites per 100 million persons followed by the Arabian countries, the Americas, 
and sub-Saharan Africa with 23, 18, and 11 Sites per 100 million people, respectively. Asia-
Pacific has much less with five per 100 million people. Europe also leads the distribution of 
sites per square kilometer with 19 Sites per million square kilometers, whereas all other 
continents possess between four and five. 
 The distribution of Sites across countries is also highly skewed. Some countries in the 
world have a large number of World Heritage Sites; whereas, other countries have few, and a 
considerable number have none (see Tables 2 and 3). 
 
TABLE 2, TABLE 3 
 
 It could be argued that every country should have the same importance with respect to 
its contribution to the heritage of humankind. This point of view emphasizes that every 
country should be of equal worth with respect to its culture for an international organization 
                                                 
3 Continents follow the UN definition. 
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such as the UN and its agency UNESCO. This applies not only to “culture” in the broadest 
sense but also to “nature”: each country has Cultural and Natural Sites worth preserving. 
With an equal number of Sites per country, any attempt to compare the “value” of the Sites 
among countries would be futile. Clearly, this is an extreme position because it does not take 
into account the size of a country as measured by population or geography (for detailed 
information about the distribution of Sites, see Frey and Pamini 2010). 
 The imbalance of World Heritage Sites according to continents and countries has been 
present from the beginning, and it has become a subject of major concern within the World 
Heritage Commission and Centre, UNESCO, and beyond. The Director of the World 
Heritage Centre, Francesco Bandarin, even went so far as to call the World Heritage List “a 
catastrophic success” (Henley 2001). As a reaction to this imbalance, in 1994, the World 
Heritage Committee started the Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible 
World Heritage List, which intends to raise the share of non-European Sites as well as the 
share of living cultures, especially “traditional cultures” included on the List. Despite this 
explicit policy and intended strong action, “the immediate success of these efforts is 
questionable” (Strasser 2002, 226). European countries make the best use of the opportunities 
offered by the “global strategy.” Regardless of whether one looks at cultural landscapes, 
modern Twentieth Century heritage, industrial heritage, or prehistoric heritage, Europe 
benefits the most from the opportunity to nominate sites in these categories, which are 
emphasized by the global strategy. 
 An unequal distribution of Sites of course does not necessarily mean that the selection 
is biased. However, a strongly unequal selection suggests that inappropriate aspects may play 
a role, such as political or bureaucratic rent seeking among the member countries. These 
aspects are unrelated to the value of global heritage. In the remainder of this paper, we 
present empirical results of the factors determining the number of Sites on the List by 
country. 
 
IV. HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS 
 
 In a first step, we investigate factors based on history, which might explain why some 
countries deserve more Sites on the List than others do. The influence of these historical 
determinants can be estimated by cross-section regressions because the variables do not 
change over time. 
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 Cultural and Natural Sites differ in their characteristics; therefore, different UNESCO 
criteria are applied. Consequently, separate regressions are used with either the total number 
of Cultural or Natural Sites per country in 2006 as a dependent variable (since most of the 
independent variables in the following regressions only existed until 2006). Appropriate 
techniques to explain a dependent variable that only takes natural numbers are a Poisson 
regression for count or negative binomial regressions. Table 4 presents the estimated 
coefficients of a negative binomial regression in order to cope with the so-called 
overdispersion of the data, that is, a variance greater than the expected value, which the 
Poisson model is not able to take into account.4 
 
TABLE 4 
 
 As a technical control variable, we use the number of years of a country in the World 
Heritage Convention, since a Site can only be listed if the respective country is a member of 
the Convention. As expected, the coefficient is positive in all specifications, that is, a country 
that has belonged to the Convention longer has more sites on the List. In most regressions, 
this coefficient is highly significant. The coefficients vary around 0.06 (eq. 3). The size of the 
coefficients can be interpreted by exponentiating the estimated coefficient to get the so-called 
incidence rate ratio (IRR); that is, the factor change in the expected count of Sites for a unit 
increase in the independent variable. In estimate (3), tenure has, for instance, an IRR = e0.059 = 
1.0689, which means that an increase in Convention membership by one year (i.e., one unit in 
our scale) leads to a relative increase of the expected number of Cultural Sites of IRR – 1 = 
6.89 percent. 
 With regard to the size of a country, one expects that the larger a country the more 
likely it is to find Sites worth including in the List. This argument seems to be more 
convincing for Natural than for Cultural Sites. A large country is expected to have more 
different types of landscapes that fit the UNESCO criteria. The estimations of the impact of 
country size (area in million square kilometers) support this hypothesis. The coefficient for 
Natural Sites is always positive and significant, and it is larger than the one for Cultural Sites. 
For example, the coefficient of 0.141 in equation (1) indicates that an increase in a country’s 
                                                 
4 For count data with many zeros, one can also estimate zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. In 
our case, these models lead to qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results. In Stata, count data models 
can be compared with the “countfit” command. A comparison of the residuals, the sum of the Pearson statistic, 
and the AIC and BIC statistics suggest applying negative binomial regressions to our data. Thus, we only show 
the results of these estimations. 
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size of one million square kilometers leads to a relative increase of the expected number of 
Cultural Sites of 15.2 percent. 
 As mentioned above, the distribution across continents is highly unequal. The 
multiple regression results are consistent with the descriptive statistic. When compared to 
Europe, all other continents have significantly fewer Cultural Sites, even when controlling for 
tenure and size of the country. For Natural Sites, the result is different. When compared to 
Europe, the Arabian countries have significantly fewer, whereas the Asian and Pacific 
countries have significantly more Natural Sites. 
 Although the continent dummies can account to some extent for cultural and historical 
differences, variables on a country level are more precise. We use O’Brien’s (2002) overview 
of the great cultures of the world to account for a country’s history.5 The variable “years of 
high civilization” reflects the number of years a country has been a part of one of the 16 most 
important historical cultures. One can expect that the more years a country experienced such 
high civilization, the more Cultural Sites that it contains. The regression results are consistent 
with this hypothesis: The coefficient for Cultural Sites is positive and highly significant. The 
coefficient for Natural Sites in contrast is, as expected, statistically not significant, which 
supports our analysis. The coefficient of 0.000543 in equation (3) indicates that an increase in 
the period of high civilizations by 100 years leads to a relative increase of the expected 
number of Cultural Sites of 5.44 percent. 
 To verify the impact of the historical development of a country on the number of Sites 
on the List, we use the historical GDP per capita and population data as used in Maddison 
(2007). The range of the data is from year 1 to 2008 (year 1, 1000, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1820, 
and yearly thereafter). However, in earlier years there are many missing values. We selected 
two points in time (1500 and 1820) with comparatively few missing values but with a 
substantial amount of time in between to cover different periods. These points in time seemed 
to be especially appropriate for Cultural Sites since the majority of Cultural Sites stem from 
the period between the tenth and the eighteenth century (van der Aa 2005). We use historical 
GDP per capita to investigate the impact of the development of a certain country at a given 
point in time. Despite many missing values, the estimated coefficients for GDP per capita on 
the number of Cultural Sites are significant and positive. As expected, the historical GDP per 
capita has no significant impact on the number of Natural Sites. 
                                                 
5 These are Mesopotamian, Arabian, Phoenician, Persian, Egyptian, Ottoman, Jewish, Greek, Occident, Aegean, 
Roman, Byzantine, Indian, Chinese, Mongolian, and Japanese. 
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 Considering the role of the size of population, we test the hypothesis to see whether 
the historical population size has a positive impact on the number of Cultural Sites. Hereby 
we implicitly assume that each person of the world has the same capacity to create cultural 
goods. The coefficients of the historical population size are in line with expectations: The 
larger the historical population was in 1500 and 1820, respectively, the higher the number of 
Cultural Sites in one country. As expected, the historical size of the population has no 
significant effect on the number of Natural Sites. Because the historical data exhibit many 
missing values, we continue by using tenure, area, and civilization years as controls in further 
estimations. 
 
V. CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATIONS: STOCK DETERMINANTS 
 
 Being on the UNESCO List is desired by many because it brings prominence and 
monetary revenue, especially from increased tourism. Therefore, the process of getting on the 
List is subject to rent seeking and has been highly politicized. The selection is subject to 
political pressures and is not solely determined by the 10 criteria deemed to be “objective” 
according to the Convention. Some countries are more active than others to secure Sites to be 
included in the List (van der Aa 2005, 81). 
 The politicians in a country decide whether they want to nominate a Site for the List. 
In a second step, experts provide advice to the World Heritage Committee, which makes the 
final decision about new Sites (for an extensive discussion of the process, see, e.g., Strasser 
2002). Several factors determine the rent-seeking process within a country and on an 
international level (e.g., within international organizations, such as UNESCO). Possible rent-
seeking factors within a country are the size of the tourist sector, the distribution of 
information via media, economic development, democratic institutions, bureaucracy, and 
federalism. Determinants that influence the nomination on the international level are the 
power of a country as expressed by GDP or the size of the population, openness, and 
influence in international organizations. The separation between these two dimensions is not 
always clear-cut; we prefer to order the variables as economic (GDP, GDP per capita, tourist 
sector, globalization) and political determinants (size of population, media, democracy, 
bureaucracy, federalism, and membership on the UN Security Council). 
 Rent seeking can be expected to have the same influence with respect to Cultural and 
Natural Sites if it provides the same prestige and the criteria allow the same extent of 
manipulation. In this respect, the distinction between Natural and Cultural Sites is somewhat 
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artificial (Pressouyre 1996). Consequently, the following regressions use the total number of 
Sites in 2006 as a dependent variable. First, we test the impact of the economic variables, 
always controlling for tenure, area, and years of civilization. Various economic determinants 
are introduced in sequence and then simultaneously tested (see Table 5). 
 
TABLE 5 
 
 Total GDP is positively and significantly correlated with the number of total Sites. 
Economically powerful countries that tend to have higher weight with UNESCO and other 
international organizations are able to put more Sites on the List. 
 The GDP per capita (GDPPC) is positively and significantly related to the number of 
total Sites. Economically more developed countries have more Sites. They may have a larger 
number of Sites for historical reasons and/or they may be better able to lobby for inclusion on 
the List. This also involves being able to prepare the documentation necessary for a 
successful application (see Strasser 2002). An argument in favor of this correlation is that 
more developed countries may be better able to maintain their Sites. 
 The total number of tourists has a positive and significant impact. However, if 
accounting for the size of the population by taking the share of tourists divided by the total 
population, the impact becomes statistically insignificant. If using the relative importance of 
the tourist sector, namely the expenditures of tourists as a share of exports, the impact is 
statistically significant and negative.6 Politicians and bureaucrats in a country with a low 
tourist income have higher incentives to lobby for more Sites on the List. In contrast, 
countries with an already well-developed tourist sector are less dependent on the World 
Heritage List to promote tourism. With respect to tourism, the cross-country estimation 
obviously raises the question of reverse causality because it is well-known that after a Site is 
nominated tourist numbers increase significantly. However, one single Site only accounts for 
a very small part of a country’s tourism. We further address this issue in our panel 
estimations in Section VI. 
 The openness of a country, represented by the KOF index of globalization (Dreher 
2006) comprises economic, social, and political globalization. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant: The more a country interacts with other countries the larger the 
number of Sites. This may be due to a higher international reputation of such countries or 
                                                 
6 This variable is sometimes also used as measure for tourist specialization. See Arezki, Cherif, and Piotrowski 
(2009). 
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because politicians in these countries care more about international recognition as offered by 
the UNESCO label, and therefore they engage more in UNESCO activities. 
 Testing all relevant economic factors simultaneously (eq. 19), the results hold: GDP 
and globalization are positively and significantly related to the number of Sites on the List, 
and tourist expenditures are negatively and significantly related. The coefficient of GDP per 
capita however is no longer significant. Therefore, we omit the variable in further regressions 
in order not to lose observations and because of a high correlation with the variables for 
globalization and media. 
 The first political determinant refers to a country’s power measured by the size of 
today’s population (Table 6, eq. 20). When using control variables, the population size 
shows no impact on the number of Sites. It can be concluded that the size of a country’s area 
is the more important determinant. 
 
TABLE 6 
 
 The role of the media is an important political and economic factor. It is expected that 
countries with a higher median density will have a higher number of Sites on the List. When 
more people are informed about (possible) Sites on the List, politicians and bureaucrats have 
a higher incentive to engage in the process in order to achieve recognition and profit from the 
popularity of the List. Possible media channels through which people are informed include 
newspapers, radio, TV, and the Internet. These variables are highly correlated with each 
other, but the number of Internet users has the fewest missing values. The number of Internet 
users is positively related to the number of Sites on the List in a statistically significant way. 
The more people have access to the news, the higher the incentive for politicians to lobby for 
putting national Sites on the List. 
 The extent to which a country is democratic or autocratic also can influence the rent-
seeking efforts of politicians. We expect that the more democratic a country is the more Sites 
it will have on the List because politicians in these countries depend more strongly on the 
need to be reelected. We use the Polity IV Index for Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, which codes democratic characteristics (Polity 2010). The estimated coefficient 
is indeed positive and statistically significant: Countries with more democratic institutions 
have a higher number of Sites on the List. 
 The general importance of a government (and bureaucracy) in a country can be 
captured by the share of government spending in GDP. The higher the public expenditure 
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share is, the bigger the influence of politicians and the size of bureaucracy in a country is. A 
higher share is expected to be correlated with a higher degree of rent seeking, but it also 
means better possibilities to prepare the applications for the List. The estimated coefficient 
turns out to be positive and statistically significant. 
 Countries with higher degrees of federalism are expected to have a higher number of 
Sites on the List. In more federal countries, a larger number of politicians want to profit from 
the popularity of the List. The sites to be included in the List must be proposed by member 
governments. However, mayors, district governments, or heritage experts make proposals for 
inclusion on the tentative list. A measure for federalism is included in the index published by 
the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). It should be noted that by using this 
index more than 50 percent of the observations are lost. The estimated coefficient is positive 
and significant: A more decentralized country has more Sites on the List, consistent with the 
theoretical hypothesis. 
 The influence of international organizations, especially organizations of the UN, is 
expected to be reflected in a larger number of Sites on the UNESCO List. Dreher, Sturm, and 
Vreeland (2009) show that being a member of the UN Security Council is related with 
receiving favorable treatment from the World Bank and IMF. To test the effect of 
membership in other important organizations, we count the years a country has been a 
permanent or nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council since it became a member 
of the World Heritage Convention. Interestingly, countries that have been a permanent or 
nonpermanent member for a longer period of time have a significantly higher probability of 
having a larger number of Sites on the List. 
 Controlling for the political determinants simultaneously (eq. 26 and 27), the main 
results are unaffected: Media (measured by Internet users), federalism, and UN Security 
Council membership (permanent and rotating) are significantly and positively correlated with 
the number of Sites. The Polity IV Index for democratic institutions is still positive but 
statistically insignificant (when controlling for federalism, which produces many missing 
values, see eq. 27), whereas the size of government spending becomes statistically 
insignificant. 
 In a last step, we estimate the economic and political determinants simultaneously 
(see Table 7).7 The main results hold (including statistical significance): Relative tourist 
                                                 
7 GDP, tourist expenditures, media, UN Security Council, and federalism. The globalization index is omitted to 
prevent problems of collinearity because it is highly correlated with the variable for media use. Further, we omit 
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expenditures are negatively correlated with the number of Sites; the coefficients of the 
number of Internet users (as a proxy for the influence of media in general), membership in 
the UN Security-Council, and federalism are positively related.8 
 
TABLE 7 
 
 Interestingly, when membership on the UN Security Council is included among the 
determinants, the economic power of a country becomes insignificant. This suggests that the 
power of a country does not take effect through its sheer size or economic power but through 
its influence in international bodies. 
 We are fully aware that cross-section regressions cannot rule out reverse causality. 
However, for most determinants, reverse causality seems to be highly implausible. The 
number of Sites is unlikely to influence country size, years of past civilizations, membership 
on the UN Security Council, or the degree of federalism. The only variable where reverse 
causality seems to be an issue in a cross-section setting is tourism. It is known that the 
number of tourists for a Site or region increases after a Site is listed (e.g., Yang, Lin, and Han 
2009). Two aspects might mitigate this problem in a cross-section setting. First, the impact of 
one Site on a country’s total tourist numbers or expenditure is very small. Second, 
substitution effects within a country (sites not listed lose tourists) make the effect on total 
tourist numbers ambiguous (Arezki, Cherif, and Piotrowski 2009). In the panel estimations, 
we address this problem again. 
 
VI. PANEL ESTIMATIONS: THE DETERMINANTS OF NEWLY ADDED SITES 
 
 The panel structure of our data set allows us to estimate the flow determinants of the 
Sites added yearly on the World Heritage List. The data range from 1972 to 2006, and the 
number of Sites nominated in a given year serves as a dependent variable. The number of 
Sites again can be distinguished into total Sites, Cultural Sites, and Natural Sites. We cannot 
estimate fixed-effect models because some of the variables do not vary over time. Among 
these is not only size of the area but also the historical GDP and population data. 
                                                                                                                                                        
GDP per capita and the size of the population not to lose more observations and for reasons of collinearity with 
media, respective area, and GDP. 
8 In regression (29), tests have shown that area and tourist expenditures become insignificant because of too 
many missing values not because of the impact or correlation with federalism. When running regression (28) 
with the same observations (N=64), the coefficients of area and tourist expenditure are insignificant, which 
indicates that in regression (29) they become insignificant due to too few observations. 
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 Table 8 depicts the negative binomial panel regressions results with random effects 
for the historical determinants. The Likelihood-ratio test indicates that the panel structure is 
preferred over a pooled estimation. 
 
TABLE 8 
  
 The results from the cross-section estimations hold: The impact of the size of the 
country is again positive, significant, and bigger for Natural Sites. Years of civilization, 
historical GDP, and historical population only have an impact on the number of Cultural Sites 
a country gets in a given year not on the number of Natural Sites. However, there is an 
interesting difference to the stock estimations concerning the impact of tenure: The number 
of years a country has been part of the Convention is negatively correlated with the number 
of Sites a country gets in a given year. The cross-section estimation suggests that the more 
years a country has been a member of the Convention the more sites it had in 2006. The panel 
estimation results show a decreasing marginal rate of new Sites. There may be two reasons 
for this: First, a country with longer tenure already has more Sites, so its stock of potential 
Sites is lower. Second, with longer tenure, there is increased competition among countries 
(more countries joined the Convention), so the probability of getting a new Site in a given 
year decreases. 
 To estimate the influence of the economic and political determinants, we perform 
negative binomial regressions with random effects and pooled cross-section structure (Table 
9). The pooled estimates contain year and continent fixed effects as well as interaction effects 
of year and continent. The estimations of the economic and political determinants are well in 
line with the cross-section results (eq. 42 with random effects and eq. 46 with pooled cross 
sections). In order to control for the impact of media here, we use the number of households 
with a TV, which reveals less missing values than Internet users (especially for earlier years). 
The impact of the media on the number of Sites nominated in a given year is positive and 
significant, as expected. The coefficients of UN Security Council membership are somewhat 
ambiguous: Although the coefficient of being a permanent member is larger than the one of 
being a rotating member, only the coefficient of being a rotating member is significant. The 
coefficient of tourist expenditures is again negative and significant. 
 
TABLE 9 
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 To address the issue of reverse causality of the tourism variable, we introduce a one-
year lag of relative tourist expenditures (eq. 43 and 47). It seems very unlikely that a Site’s 
nomination in a given year has an impact on the tourist expenditures in the year before. This 
effect would only occur if a Site is expected to be nominated. However, we did not find any 
evidence in the literature, travel guides, or newspapers that this might be the case. The 
coefficients of the lagged tourist expenditures confirm the negative and significant correlation 
with the number of Sites a country obtains in a given year. 
 In a last step, we introduce federalism (eq. 44 and 45 with random effects and eq. 48 
and 49 with pooled cross section), but again this variable is associated with a considerable 
loss in the number observations. However, even in this specification, the sign (and often 
roughly the size) of the coefficients remains the same. 
 In addition to the problem of missing values, the panel regressions (in contrast to the 
cross-section estimations of the stock determinants) have to deal with a second issue, which 
decreases the likelihood of achieving significant coefficients: The time lag of the application 
process. Local politicians need time before a site is accepted on the country’s tentative list 
and until it is officially nominated. After that, the Committee needs time to decide on the 
applications. The duration varies greatly between 12 months and eight years, as in the case of 
Dorset and East Devon Coast (UK) (see Leask and Fyall 2001). To be completely accurate, 
we would have to know the nomination process duration for every site and accordingly apply 
lagged independent variables (e.g., for Dorset, a lag of eight years). Because this information 
is not available, the estimates shown are necessarily an approximation of the real effect, 
which underestimates instead of overestimating the impact. In general, when controlling for 
historical, political, and economic determinants, the main results of the cross-section 
estimations are supported: Tourist expenditures are significant and negative; media 
distribution (in this case the percentage of households with TV) is positive and significant, 
and being a rotating member of the UN Security Council is positive and significant. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The implementation of the UNESCO World Heritage List to protect the common 
global heritage constitutes a great step forward toward preserving one of the most important 
global public goods on our planet. However, there are also negative aspects related to the 
List, such as the destruction of Sites (usually by increased deterioration) or substitution of 
funds away from sites not on the List. Here, we focus on the striking imbalance of the List. 
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The distribution across continents and countries is highly unequal, which suggests that other 
factors than the 10 “objective” UNESCO criteria play a role. 
 We first investigate the historical reasons of why some countries may have more Sites 
than others do: The tenure of a country in the Convention, the size of the country, the number 
of years of high civilization, historical GDP, and historical population are all found to be 
positively correlated with the number of Sites. Although size is more important for the 
number of Natural Sites, historical GDP and population reflecting past development and 
cultural potential of a country are more important for Cultural Sites. 
 Using historical factors as controls, cross-section estimates are used to identify the 
stock determinants of getting on the List (total number of Sites in 2006 as a dependent 
variable). When simultaneously controlling for several factors, media distribution, 
federalism, and UN Security Council membership have a statistically positive effect on the 
number of Sites on the UNESCO List, whereas tourist expenditures have a significant and 
negative one. Panel-data models are able to estimate the flow determinants of being 
nominated for the List (number of Sites per year as a dependent variable). Even though there 
are problems due to the unequal and variable time lag from the beginning of the application 
process to the final nomination and missing values, the main results are confirmed. Although 
the media is positively correlated with the number of Sites per year, tourist expenditures are 
negative. In the panel specifications, the impact of being a rotating member of the UN 
Security Council is more robust than being a permanent member. 
 The analysis undertaken suggests that the List is not solely determined by cultural or 
historical factors but also by political and economic factors. These results are offered here for 
discussion. We do not normatively judge whether these factors should, or should not, have 
any influence on the selection of Sites on the World Heritage List. However, the claim that 
inclusion on the List is solely, or even mainly, “objectively” determined by the 10 criteria of 
the Convention is open to serious doubt. The empirical analysis, which shows that inclusion 
on the List is systematically correlated with economic and political factors unrelated to what 
“World Heritage” is claimed to be, suggests that extraneous factors play a significant role. 
This is not surprising as such but testifies to the importance of the World Heritage List. 
Countries find it necessary to try to influence the selection on the List exactly because the 
List is considered to be relevant. The World Heritage List should be looked at in this light, 
and it has to be discussed and an evaluation made of which economic and political influences 
are deemed to be legitimate and which are deemed to be unwarranted. To mitigate the impact 
of factors unrelated to the value of heritage, several approaches to reform the List are 
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possible. For example, reduce the role of experts by conducting willingness-to-pay studies; 
limit the number Sites on the List to increase competition to get on or stay on the List; 
introduce World Culture Certificates to protect global heritage more efficiently (see Frey and 
Pamini 2009); or support countries with no Sites to apply for the List (which UNESCO 
actually has been doing since 1994, so far without significantly reducing the imbalance of the 
List). 
 This paper serves to raise our understanding of the political or economic factors that 
influence the composition of the List. It may help the decision makers involved in deciding 
about World Heritage issues to take steps to improve the selection of World Heritage Sites 
that truly reflect “the cultural and natural heritage around the world considered to be of 
outstanding value to humanity.” 
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APPENDIX 
The first six UNESCO criteria refer to Cultural Sites: 
i. to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius; 
ii. to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a 
cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental 
arts, town-planning or landscape design; 
iii. to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization 
which is living or which has disappeared; 
iv. to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological 
ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history; 
v. to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use 
which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the 
environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible 
change; 
vi. to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with 
beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The 
Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with 
other criteria); 
 
The last four criteria concern Natural Sites: 
vii. to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and 
aesthetic importance; 
viii. to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the 
record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, 
or significant geomorphic or physiographic features; 
ix. to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological 
processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine 
ecosystems and communities of plants and animals; 
x. to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of 
biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of science or conservation. 
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Table 1: The World Heritage List according to types of heritage and continents, 2010. 
Region Total Sites Cultural Sites Natural Sites Mixed Sites 
Africa (sub-Saharan) 81 43 35 3 
Americas 162 101 57 4 
Asia and Pacific 197 137 51 9 
Arabian Countries 66 60 5 1 
Europe 434 380 44 10 
Total 940 721 192 27 
Note: 21 Heritage Sites go across two countries each, one Site goes across 10 countries. This 
and all further tables count Sites as many times as the number of countries involved. We do 
not count the Old City of Jerusalem (ID 48) because it is associated with no country. Sites 
given to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are still counted under Serbia, although 
they now are listed under Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Itchan Kala (ID 
543) is counted under Russia because in 1990 Uzbekistan still was part of it. We do not count 
the Bialowieza Forest (ID 33) for Belarus because in 1979 neither Belarus nor the USSR was 
in the World Heritage Convention. We do not count the Historic Center of Rome (ID 91) for 
the Holy See because in 1980 it was not yet a member of the World Heritage Convention. 
Although we are interested into the election process, we include the two delisted Sites 
(Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in Oman, listed in 1994 and delisted in 2007 ID 654, as well as 
Dresden Elbe Valley in Germany, listed in 2004 and delisted in 2009 ID 1156). 
Source: Frey and Pamini (2010), based on http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (accessed on August 
30, 2010). 
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Table 2: Countries with a large number (ten or more) of Sites in the World Heritage 
List, 2010. 
Country Total Cultural Natural  Mixed 
Italy 44 42 2 0
Spain 41 36 3 2
China 40 28 8 4
France 35 31 3 1
Germany 34 32 2 0
Mexico 31 27 4 0
India 28 23 5 0
United Kingdom 28 23 4 1
Russia 25 16 9 0
United States 21 8 12 1
Australia 18 3 11 4
Brazil 18 11 7 0
Greece 17 15 0 2
Canada 15 6 9 0
Japan 14 11 3 0
Sweden 14 12 1 1
Poland 13 12 1 0
Portugal 13 12 1 0
Czech Republic 12 12 0 0
Iran 12 12 0 0
Peru 11 7 2 2
Yugoslavia 11 7 3 1
Belgium 10 10 0 0
South Korea 10 9 1 0
Switzerland 10 7 3 0
Selection Total 525 412 94 19
World Heritage Total 940 721 192 27
Note: The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. Under Yugoslavia we consider the Sites 
of the whole Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and those of Serbia after the 
country disintegration. 
Source: Frey and Pamini (2010), based on http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 
30.8.2010. 
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Table 3: Countries with no or only one Cultural Site in the World Heritage List, 2010 
 Without Any Cultural Site With Only One Cultural Site 
Region Country 
Entry 
Year Country 
Entry 
Year 
Africa 
(sub-
Saharan) 
Angola 1991 Benin 1982 
Burundi 1982 Botswana 1998 
Cameroon 1982 Burkina Faso 1987 
 Central African Republic 1980 Cape Verde 1988 
 Chad 1999 Madagascar 1983 
 Comoros 2000 Malawi 1982 
 Congo 1987 Mozambique 1982 
 Cote d'Ivoire 1981 Namibia 2000 
 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
1974 Togo 1998 
 Uganda 1986 
 Djibouti 2007   
 Eritrea 2001   
 Gabon 1986   
 Guinea 1979   
 Guinea-Bissau 2006   
 Lesotho 2003   
 Liberia 2002   
 Niger 1974   
 Rwanda 2000   
 Sao Tome and Principe 2006   
 Seychelles 1980   
 Sierra Leone 2005   
 Swaziland 2005   
 Zambia 1984   
Americas Antigua and Barbuda 1983 Dominican Republic 1985 
 Barbados 2002 El Salvador 1991 
 Belize 1990 Haiti 1980 
 Costa Rica 1977 Honduras 1979 
 Dominica 1995 Nicaragua 1979 
 Grenada 1998 Paraguay 1988 
 Guyana 1977 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1986 
 Jamaica 1983 Suriname 1997 
 Saint Lucia 1991 Uruguay 1989 
 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
2003   
 Trinidad and Tobago 2005   
Asia and 
Pacific 
Bhutan 2001 Kyrgyz Republic 1995 
Cook Islands 2009 Malaysia 1988 
 Fiji 1990 Mongolia 1990 
 Kiribati 2000 North Korea 1998 
 Maldives 1986 Papua New Guinea 1997 
 Marshall Islands 2002 Vanuatu 2002 
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 Micronesia 2002   
 Myanmar 1994   
 New Zealand 1984   
 Niue 2001   
 Palau 2002   
 Samoa 2001   
 Solomon Islands 1992   
 Tajikistan 1992   
 Tonga 2004   
Arabian 
Countries 
Kuwait 2002 Bahrain 1991 
Qatar 1984 Mauritania 1981 
 United Arab Emirates 2001 Saudi Arabia 1978 
  Sudan 1974 
Europe Macedonia 1997 Andorra 1997 
 Monaco 1978 Iceland 1995 
 Montenegro 2006 Luxembourg 1983 
 Slovenia 1992 Moldova 2002 
  San Marino 1991 
  Vatican 1982 
Note: The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. Montenegro has a Cultural Site that has 
been listed at the time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and is not 
counted here. 
Source: Frey and Pamini (2010), based on http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (accessed on 
August 8, 2010). 
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Table 4: Historical determinants of a countries number of Cultural and Natural Sites in the World Heritage List 2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural 
                          
# Years in 
Convention 
0.0854*** 0.0879*** 0.0590*** 0.0773*** 0.0267 0.0434* 0.0454** 0.0195 0.0267 0.0251 0.0432*** 0.0371** 
(7.531) (7.867) (5.364) (5.940) (1.214) (1.791) (2.443) (0.960) (1.512) (1.275) (2.686) (2.139) 
Size of country 
(in million sqk) 
0.141*** 0.187*** 0.111*** 0.218*** 0.0422 0.151*** 0.0659* 0.186*** -0.0146 0.171*** 0.00477 0.185*** 
(3.171) (11.31) (2.743) (6.988) (1.239) (5.229) (1.849) (5.955) (-0.444) (5.713) (0.128) (6.099) 
Africa -2.008*** 0.0983           
(-7.947) (0.413)           
America -1.459*** 0.162           
(-6.109) (0.764)           
Asia/Pacific -0.902*** 0.427**           
(-3.988) (2.010)           
Arabian -1.454*** -1.551***           
(-4.995) (-3.215)           
Europe (reference) 
           
# Years of high 
civilization 
  0.000543*** -9.85e-05         
  (7.216) (-1.393)         
GDP per capita 
in year 1500 
    0.00266*** -0.000469       
    (2.956) (-0.454)       
GDP per capita 
in year 1820 
      0.00150*** 0.000461     
      (3.669) (1.251)     
Population in 
year 1500 
        1.58e-05** 4.84e-06   
        (2.244) (1.095)   
Population in 
year 1820 
          7.82e-06** 1.56e-06 
          (2.196) (0.969) 
Constant 0.178 -2.318*** -0.725*** -1.974*** 0.171 -0.374 -0.196 -0.609 1.531*** -0.400 0.737* -0.846* 
 (0.685) (-7.814) (-3.008) (-6.293) (0.201) (-0.375) (-0.335) (-1.054) (3.433) (-0.789) (1.875) (-1.935) 
Observations 182 182 182 182 32 32 50 50 50 50 87 87 
Note: The dependent is either the number of Cultural or Natural Sites of a country in 2006. All coefficients estimated with negative binomial regressions; z-values in parentheses: *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. All regressions refer only to the countries parties of the World Heritage Convention in 2006.  
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien (2002) , Maddison (2007). 
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Table 5: Economic determinants of a countries number of total Sites in the World Heritage List 2006 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites 
                
GDP  0.000377***      0.000247** 
(2.825)      (2.151) 
GDP per capita   0.0321***     -0.00868 
 (4.361)     (-0.786) 
# Tourists   4.04e-05***     
  (5.444)     
# Tourists / 
population 
   -63.56    
   (-1.302)    
Tourists expend / 
exports 
    -0.0267***  -0.0223*** 
    (-4.073)  (-3.281) 
Globalization 
index 
     0.0292*** 0.0288*** 
     (5.381) (3.645) 
# Years in 
Convention 
0.0619*** 0.0648*** 0.0551*** 0.0644*** 0.0560*** 0.0618*** 0.0543*** 
(6.390) (6.820) (6.308) (6.400) (5.268) (6.185) (5.389) 
Size of country (in 
million sqk) 
0.113*** 0.144*** 0.0893*** 0.140*** 0.120*** 0.147*** 0.0958*** 
(3.295) (4.296) (2.798) (3.785) (3.399) (4.307) (3.086) 
# Years of high 
civilization 
0.000350*** 0.000316*** 0.000221*** 0.000427*** 0.000366*** 0.000250*** 0.000221*** 
(5.467) (5.293) (3.802) (6.468) (5.935) (4.216) (3.850) 
Constant -0.416* -0.622*** -0.275 -0.374* 0.204 -2.083*** -1.547*** 
 (-1.953) (-2.881) (-1.422) (-1.677) (0.814) (-4.892) (-2.907) 
Observations 169 169 168 168 146 153 133 
Note: The dependent is the total number of Sites of a country in 2006. All coefficients estimated with negative binomial regressions; z-values 
in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. The figures are for 2006 and refer only to the 
countries parties of the World Heritage Convention in 2006.  
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien (2002) , Maddison (2007). 
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Table 6: Political determinants of a countries number of total Sites in the World Heritage List 2006 
  (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites Total Sites 
                  
Population  0.0657      0.0590 0.0768 
(0.821)      (1.320) (1.254) 
Internet user   0.0150***     0.0120*** 0.00781** 
 (4.917)     (3.568) (2.004) 
PolityIV-Index of 
democracy 
  0.0242***    0.0138* 0.00834 
  (3.924)    (1.860) (1.165) 
Gvt spending / GDP    0.0319**   -0.00246 0.00700 
   (2.033)   (-0.157) (0.382) 
Federalism-Index     1.460***   0.917*** 
    (4.678)   (3.139) 
# years UN-Sec_ 
Council_perm 
     0.0652*** 0.0417*** 0.0389*** 
     (4.378) (2.958) (2.837) 
# years UN-Sec_ 
Council_rotating 
     0.252*** 0.148*** 0.117** 
     (6.315) (3.788) (2.544) 
# Years in 
Convention 
0.0678*** 0.0652*** 0.0578*** 0.0695*** 0.0584*** 0.0348*** 0.0372*** 0.0374*** 
(6.883) (7.038) (5.897) (6.576) (4.505) (3.738) (3.727) (2.798) 
Size of country (in 
million sqk) 
0.129*** 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.0464 0.0730** 0.0614** -0.0350 
(3.192) (4.315) (3.984) (3.836) (1.020) (2.226) (2.162) (-0.726) 
# Years of high 
civilization 
0.000410*** 0.000309*** 0.000366*** 0.000344*** 0.000359*** 0.000317*** 0.000219*** 0.000215*** 
(6.006) (5.356) (6.227) (5.221) (4.529) (6.092) (4.318) (3.044) 
Constant -0.527** -0.755*** -0.267 -0.902** -0.797** -0.217 -0.202 -0.560 
 (-2.454) (-3.455) (-1.197) (-2.538) (-2.298) (-1.155) (-0.638) (-1.288) 
Observations 180 175 155 153 78 182 136 67 
Note: The dependent is the total number of Sites of a country in 2006. All coefficients estimated with negative binomial regressions; z-values in parentheses: *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. The figures are for 2006 and refer only to the countries parties of the World Heritage Convention 
in 2006.  
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien (2002) , Maddison (2007). 
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Table 7: Economic and political determinants of a countries number of total 
Sites in the World Heritage List 2006 
  (28) (29) 
 Total Sites Total Sites 
      
GDP -2.91e-05 -2.66e-05 
(-0.408) (-0.461) 
Tourists expend / 
exports 
-0.0155*** -0.00388 
(-2.766) (-0.492) 
Internet user 0.00954*** 0.00705** 
(3.316) (2.155) 
# years UN-Sec_ 
Council_perm 
0.0524*** 0.0512*** 
(3.271) (3.526) 
# years UN-Sec_ 
Council_rotating 
0.185*** 0.139*** 
(4.485) (3.002) 
Federalism  1.072*** 
 (3.603) 
# Years in Convention 0.0282*** 0.0297** 
(2.817) (2.337) 
Size of country (in 
million sqk) 
0.0693** 0.00576 
(2.332) (0.147) 
# Years of high 
civilization 
0.000255*** 0.000240*** 
(5.388) (3.855) 
Constant 0.155 -0.369 
 (0.670) (-1.063) 
Observations 139 64 
Note: The dependent is the total number of Sites of a country in 2006. All coefficients estimated with negative 
binomial regressions; z-values in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for 
Table 1 apply. The figures are for 2006 and refer only to the countries parties of the World Heritage Convention 
in 2006.  
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien 
(2002) , Maddison (2007). 
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Table 8: Panel estimations of the historical determinants of the yearly nominations of Cultural and Natural Sites in the World Heritage List per country until 2006  
  (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) 
 Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural Cultural Natural 
                          
# Years in 
Convention 
-0.00456 -0.0221** -0.00965* -0.0258** -0.00193 -0.00283 -0.00539 -0.0127 -0.0120* -0.0236* -0.0123* -0.0213* 
(-0.774) (-2.128) (-1.665) (-2.539) (-0.258) (-0.198) (-0.760) (-0.991) (-1.764) (-1.851) (-1.955) (-1.923) 
Size of country 
(in million sqk) 
0.146*** 0.213*** 0.106*** 0.240*** 0.0226 0.140*** 0.0518* 0.179*** -0.00821 0.176*** 0.0187 0.195*** 
(3.663) (8.142) (3.091) (7.261) (0.745) (5.100) (1.759) (6.588) (-0.283) (6.044) (0.565) (6.383) 
Africa -1.863*** 0.352           
(-7.690) (1.255)           
America -1.014*** 0.473*           
(-4.644) (1.739)           
Asia/Pacific -1.080*** 0.435           
(-5.085) (1.538)           
Arabian -1.236*** -1.146**           
(-4.840) (-2.095)           
Europe (reference) 
           
# Years of high 
civilization 
  0.000371*** -0.000128         
  (6.057) (-1.606)         
GDP per capita 
in year 1500 
    0.00172** -0.00168       
    (2.291) (-1.419)       
GDP per capita 
in year 1820 
      0.00149*** 0.000302     
      (4.434) (0.765)     
Population in 
year 1500 
        9.18e-06* 8.26e-07   
        (1.879) (0.170)   
Population in 
year 1820 
          3.80e-06* 1.40e-07 
          (1.807) (0.0816) 
Constant -0.0230 -1.355*** -1.041*** -0.912** -1.071* -0.501 -1.552*** -1.415** -0.117 -0.937* -0.281 -0.714 
 (-0.118) (-2.603) (-5.365) (-1.973) (-1.907) (-0.587) (-4.408) (-2.233) (-0.550) (-1.651) (-1.444) (-1.210) 
Observations 3,756 3,756 3,756 3,756 827 827 1,245 1,245 1,263 1,263 2,149 2,149 
Number of id 183 183 183 183 32 32 50 50 50 50 87 87 
Note: The dependent variable is either a country’s number of Cultural or Natural Sites nominated in a given year. All coefficients estimated with negative binomial panel estimations with 
random effects. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. All figures are panel data from a countries year of entry in the 
World Heritage Convention until 2006.  
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien (2002) , Maddison (2007). 
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Table 9: Panel estimations of the economical and political determinants of  yearly nominated Sites in the World Heritage List until 2006 
  (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) 
 Panel, RE Panel, RE Panel, RE Panel, RE Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
                  
GDP  6.82e-05 9.51e-05 -4.66e-07 -2.83e-05 5.08e-05 4.36e-05 5.93e-05 4.55e-05 
(0.594) (0.637) (-0.00410) (-0.209) (0.485) (0.355) (0.945) (0.545) 
Tourists expend 
/ exports 
-0.0252***  -0.0205  -0.0287***  -0.0134  
(-2.798)  (-1.567)  (-3.486)  (-1.179)  
Lag Tourists 
expend / exports 
 -0.0222**  -0.0164  -0.0278***  -0.00915 
 (-2.313)  (-1.213)  (-2.984)  (-0.791) 
TV per HH 
 
0.0116*** 0.0109*** 0.00841* 0.00585 0.0148*** 0.0137*** 0.0162* 0.0127 
(3.432) (2.982) (1.748) (1.134) (3.246) (2.877) (1.925) (1.519) 
UN-Security 
Council_perm 
0.596 0.466 0.742 0.759 0.227 0.173 0.226 0.288 
(1.272) (0.913) (1.399) (1.318) (0.694) (0.484) (0.919) (1.280) 
UN-Security 
Council_rotating
0.322* 0.314 0.241 0.203 0.424*** 0.392** 0.209 0.183 
(1.724) (1.581) (1.030) (0.795) (2.644) (2.038) (1.360) (0.870) 
Federalism-
index 
  0.637 0.657   0.307 0.376 
  (1.318) (1.285)   (0.713) (0.820) 
# Years in 
Convention 
-0.0271** -0.0332*** -0.0407*** -0.0428*** 0.0138 0.0124 0.00315 -0.000905 
(-2.446) (-2.682) (-2.664) (-2.602) (1.081) (0.883) (0.174) (-0.0463) 
Size of country 
(in million sqk) 
0.0775* 0.0941* -0.0358 -0.0777 0.0609*** 0.0713*** -0.0400 -0.0547 
(1.769) (1.927) (-0.467) (-0.918) (2.863) (2.821) (-0.866) (-0.995) 
# Years of high 
civilization 
0.000261*** 0.000281*** 0.000405*** 0.000476*** 0.000218** 0.000220** 0.000494*** 0.000539*** 
(3.313) (3.211) (3.102) (3.295) (2.214) (2.158) (2.748) (2.815) 
Constant 0.189 0.591 0.540 1.088 194.9*** 221.3*** 199.2*** 199.5*** 
 (0.329) (0.835) (0.593) (0.868) (4.197) (4.062) (3.230) (2.983) 
         
Observations 1,390 1,274 700 645 1,390 1,274 700 645 
Number of id 153 150 71 71         
Note: The dependent variable is a country’s total number of Sites nominated in a given year. The coefficients (42)-(45) are estimated with negative binomial panel 
estimations with random effects, the coefficients (46)-(49) show negative binomial pooled cross section estimates. The pooled estimates also contain year and continent fixed 
effects.  
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The same remarks as for Table 1 apply. All figures are panel data from a countries year of entry in the World 
Heritage Convention until 2006 
Source: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list, accessed on 30.8.2010. World Bank Development Indicators, O’Brien (2002) , Maddison (2007).  
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